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ANOMALY DETECTION USING ADAPTIVE
RESONANCE THEORY
DANIEL ROSSELL
ABSTRACT
This thesis focuses on the problem of anomaly detection in computer networks.
Anomalies are often malicious intrusion attempts that represent a serious threat to
network security. Adaptive Resonance Theory (ART) is used as a classification scheme
for identifying malicious network traffic. ART was originally developed as a theory to
explain how the human eye categorizes visual patterns. For network intrusion detec-
tion, the core ART algorithm is implemented as a clustering algorithm that groups
network traffic into clusters. A machine learning process allows the number of clusters
to change over time to best conform to the data. Network traffic is characterized by
network flows, which represent a packet, or series of packets, between two distinct
nodes on a network. These flows can contain a number of attributes, including IP
addresses, ports, size, and duration. These attributes form a multi-dimensional vec-
tor that is used in the clustering process. Once data is clustered along the defined
dimensions, anomalies are identified as data points that do not match known good
or nominal network traffic. The ART clustering algorithm is tested on a realistic
network environment that was generated using the network flow simulation tool FS.
The clustering results for this simulation show very promising detection rates for the
ART clustering algorithm.
v
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Network Intrusion Detection
At the most basic level, intrusion detection is the problem of identifying malicious
attempts to attack or compromise a computer network. These malicious attempts can
come in a variety of forms, but regardless of the methods used or motive, the attacker
must send network traffic to and from the target’s computer in order to successfully
carry out an attack. It is important to have a reliable system to inspect network traffic
and identify intrusion attempts as they happen. Firewalls have traditionally been a
static first line of defense for networks by explicitly denying certain types of traffic
based on the ports and IP addresses being used. Intrusion detection systems take a
more active approach to network defense by performing a more in depth examination
of network traffic. As such, an effective intrusion detection system that can quickly
and accurately identify anomalies is a core component of network defense.
Attempts to identify harmful network traffic can be broadly categorized into two
types of network intrusion detection systems. Signature-based systems utilize in depth
packet inspection to match the incoming packet to the signature of a known attack
in its database. A widely used open source version of this type of system is Snort
(Snort, 2013). Anomaly based intrusion detection was originally proposed as a con-
cept by (Denning, 1986). These types of systems attempt to identify network traffic
that varies from previously identified normal traffic patterns. With anomaly based
systems, no signature exists to match a specific attack pattern. Thus, anomalies can
2only be identified as traffic that does not match what is known to be good or nom-
inal network traffic. To that end, anomaly-based intrusion detection systems must
first learn to characterize normal network traffic so that accurate classification can
be made. These types of systems have the ability to detect new types of attacks for
which no signature currently exists. This is important in network security because
many unknown or zero day attacks cannot be detected by signature based systems
due to the lack of a corresponding signature.
The earliest anomaly based systems in use were expert systems that used a
database of rules of determine when an anomaly occurred (Teng et al., 1990). This
type of approach to anomaly detection was extended to include data mining tech-
niques that allowed for the definition of association rules based on network traffic
history (Agrawal and Srikant, 1994). Many anomaly detection systems use various
statistical measures of traffic data and identify variations based on statistical calcu-
lations (Lakhina et al., 2005). More recent techniques are based on machine learning
models, which have proven very effective at characterizing normal and abnormal net-
work traffic. These include SVM based systems (Locke et al., 2003), (Hu et al., 2003)
which are well suited to anomaly detection as it is essentially a binary classification
problem, and neural network architectures (Ryan et al., 1998).
The ART Anomaly Detection Algorithm falls into the category of cluster analysis
techniques. These types of algorithms cluster network traffic based on the features
extracted from network packets and attempt to identify anomalies as network traffic
that cannot easily be clustered with normal network traffic. Traditional clustering
techniques such as k-means specify a set number of clusters and then create non
overlapping partitions by minimizing a distance function. Hierarchical models use a
distance function to successively group data points that are closer or farther away.
Other types of clustering models include density based clustering and distribution
3based clustering using statistical models.
The underlying assumption for clustering based anomaly detection systems is
that traffic patterns will emerge as distinct clusters in the chosen feature space and
that anomalies will be data points which do not easily fit in these traffic patterns.
Thus the goal in clustering algorithms for intrusion detection is to identify the data
points that cannot be easily clustered with nominal network traffic. This is commonly
referred to as outlier detection. However, many traditional clustering techniques are
poorly suited to anomaly identification as their underlying characteristics rely on
assumptions about the distribution of data points that do not necessarily hold for
network traffic. For example k-means clustering requires a specific number of clusters
to be determined beforehand. This could limit the algorithm’s ability to identify an
anomaly as it could easily be hidden within a normal cluster.
Research has shown that many of these clustering techniques can be effective at
anomaly identification under certain circumstances. In (Papalexakis et al., 2012) they
use a simple co-clustering scheme to obtain very promising results on the DARPA 99
Intrusion Detection Dataset (MIT, 2013). Clustering techniques are also commonly
used in conjunction with common classification methods such a k Nearest Neighbor or
decision trees. These combined efforts have shown very good results in most cases and
generally outperform an anomaly detection method based on a single method alone
(Muniyandi et al., 2012). The ART intrusion detection algorithm takes aspects from
various classification and clustering techniques and the original ART methodology to
develop a unique method that is well suited to clustering network traffic flows.
1.2 Adaptive Resonance Theory
Adaptive Resonance Theory was originally developed in the field of biology as a way
to identify how the human brain recognizes and categorizes visual patterns (Carpenter
4and Grossberg, 1985). As such, it provides an architecture for pattern matching and
machine learning that can be applied to the analysis of network traffic. The original
version of ART only allowed for analog signal inputs. However, the second version of
ART was extended to include arbitrary sequences of input patterns (Carpenter and
Grossberg, 1987). It is this second version that was the motivation for this thesis.
The ART algorithm defines structures which adapt in real time based on the
sequence of input patterns. The generalized version of this concept allows for any
sequence of well-defined inputs to be classified in this way. The ART algorithm has
three basic steps. In the first step the input data is processed based on the defined
features into an m-dimensional space. The second step uses competitive learning to
find the best match for each input in the defined m-dimensional space. The third step
provides feedback in which the matched input influences the structure of the cluster
or pattern it was matched with, or in the case of no match, a new cluster or pattern
is created. This process is repeated until a resonant or equilibrium state is reached.
For anomaly detection the key area of interest is the case in which an input pattern
cannot be matched to an existing structure. This is an anomaly in the most basic
sense of the word.
The traditional implementation of ART is done using neural networks that classify
inputs by either matching them to an existing pattern or creating a new one to indicate
the emergence of a new input type. For network anomaly detection is was ideal to
adapt the ART techniques to a clustering method and perform classification based on
outlier analysis. This decision was made for several reasons. First, it has been shown
that neural network algorithms are computationally more expensive than clustering
techniques and the ability of the algorithm to perform in real time on a live network
environment was considered. Second, the implementation of both the simulation
and mathematical calculations is significantly easier to accomplish under a clustering
5framework. Additionally, the need for a human analyst to easily be able to visualize
the network data and provide feedback to aid in the classification process made the
clustering model more desirable.
One of the biggest problems facing all anomaly based intrusion detection systems
is the identification of the specific features of network traffic that will be used for
anomaly identification. Using too many features increases the computational com-
plexity of analyzing data and leads to higher false positive rates. On the other hand,
not selecting enough features can make detection difficult and the anomaly detection
rate may suffer as a result. The ART clustering algorithm is able to achieve high
detection rates with only a minimal feature set by examining network traffic at the
flow level rather than packet by packet. Clustering algorithms typically do not per-
form well on datasets of high dimensionality. However using network flows limits the
characterization of network traffic to a few key dimensions so that the data can be
accurately and efficiently clustered. The specifics of the feature set used in the ART
clustering algorithm will be explained in Chapter Three.
The ART algorithm uses the notion of vigilance to determine the minimum sim-
ilarity score needed between two distinct objects in order for them to be grouped
together. For example a vigilance parameter of 0.9 indicates that objects must have
a 90% match rate in order to be grouped together. This idea of vigilance determines
how network traffic flows are partitioned into clusters. The ART algorithm allows for
a dynamic number of clusters based on how closely related the data points are to one
another and the vigilance parameter.
The machine learning aspect of the ART algorithm allows the composition of the
clusters to change over time. Each new data point is added to the cluster with which
it is most similar. As a point is added to a cluster, the overall composition of the
clusters shifts proportionately and other points in the same cluster must re-evaluate
6their similarity to the cluster as a whole. This unsupervised learning approach is
ideally suited to analyzing network traffic which has changing traffic patterns over
time and where the concept of good or bad network traffic is not known beforehand.
The concept of a threshold is a key aspect of the ART clustering algorithm that
allows for classification of normal or anomalous network traffic. The underlying as-
sumption is that malicious network traffic will compromise only a small percentage
of total network traffic and that anomalies will exist as small isolated clusters that
could not be categorized with normal network traffic. As such, the threshold specifies
the minimum number of flows of a specific type that must be observed in order for
traffic to be considered normal. This value is needed because there can be numerous
clusters compromising distinct types of network traffic that are not anomalies but
that are different enough from each other and thus could not be clustered together.
The threshold and vigilance parameters combined form a classification system by en-
suring that anomalies are not clustered with normal traffic and that they are properly
identified.
1.3 Contribution
This thesis provides an implementation of Adaptive Resonance Theory to network
intrusion detection. This application of a biological theory to the field of cyber
security research provides a novel way to develop algorithms for anomaly detection.
Results show that the ART intrusion detection algorithm is capable of very good
anomaly detection rates with a low false positive rate. It is also capable of analyzing
incoming packets at rates faster than 1Gbps which makes it practical for use in modern
networks.
The machine learning component of the algorithm makes it adaptable to changes
in network traffic over time. The detection and false positive rates also tend to
7improve over time once the algorithm is deployed on a particular network. The
ability to change over time is also useful for networks that do not have consistent
traffic patterns. The ability to distinguish between a potential anomaly and simply
the emergence of a new but non anomalous traffic pattern is an important one.
In reality no single anomaly detection algorithm can solve the problem of identify-
ing malicious network traffic. The problem of identifying abnormal traffic flows when
no signature exists will always be a problem in the field of cyber security. The ART
algorithm provides a tool for anomaly detection that can be very effectively used in
a real world intrusion detection system.
This thesis is outlined as follows. Chapter two will give an in depth explanation of
Adaptive Resonance Theory and the mathematical foundation that forms the basis
of the learning process. It will also explain how this theory was adapted to handle
network traffic flows and give a theoretical overview of the ART Clustering Algorithm
and how it is implemented to detect anomalies in network traffic flows. Chapter three
gives the details of the simulation methodology including the use of the network flow
simulation tool FS (Sommers et al., 2011) to generate reliable test data. Chapter four
analyzes the results of the simulation data over different simulation parameters and
explains how to fine tune the algorithm to achieve optimal results. It also includes
a comparison of results from other types of anomaly detection algorithms. Lastly
chapter five concludes the thesis with a summary of the algorithm as well as proposals
for future research.
8Chapter 2
Adaptive Resonance Theory Overview
2.1 Original ART Algorithm
At its core, ART is a neural network algorithm that matches inputs to a known
pattern, or creates a new pattern if no match can be made. Although ART was
originally developed to match visual patterns, this concept can be generalized to
any type of data. The concept of vigilance is used to determine how closely an
input must match an existing pattern for classification. At a higher vigilance value
a closer match is required in order for a given input to be classified with a given
pattern. Input data can be of any form in the second version of ART (Carpenter
and Grossberg, 1987). Thus, a single input may have multiple dimensions and each
dimension is independently compared to known patterns and matching is done based
on a composite of all dimensions.
The second important feature of the ART algorithm is the machine learning pro-
cess. Once an input is successfully matched to a given pattern the algorithm updates
the pattern via a process known as the reset function. Each pattern has a prototype
that represents the combined sum of all inputs that have matched the given pattern.
The prototype vector is updated whenever a new input is matched to its correspond-
ing pattern. The learning parameter β determines how much influence the addition
or removal of an input has on the prototype. A higher β parameter corresponds to
larger shifts in the prototype vector. This dynamic learning process helps to ensure
that each input is matched to the best available pattern. It is possible that a given
9Figure 2·1: ART Algorithm
prototype could change over time so that inputs previously matched to that pattern
are no longer valid. For this reason the process must be repeated until an equilibrium
or resonant state is achieved.
The algorithm for the basic ART algorithm is shown in Figure 2-1. Each input
is comprised of a vector of m dimensions. These dimensions are then compared to
the prototype vector W for each of the n possible patterns. The winning pattern J
has its prototype vector updated with the addition of the new information from the
input vector I. This is known as the reset function because once this process occurs,
the algorithm essentially resets and is ready to process the next input vector in the
set.
Since the vigilance parameter determines how closely a given input must match a
pattern, it is possible that no match can be made. In this case, the input is too distinct
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from all known patterns and the input itself becomes the basis of a new pattern. This
situation is especially useful for anomaly detection. An anomaly is essentially a piece
of information or input that is uniquely different from what is expected to be normal.
This is precisely what occurs in the ART architecture when a new pattern is formed
because no good match could be found.
2.2 ART Clustering Algorithm
For network anomaly detection, the original ART algorithm was modified and imple-
mented as a clustering algorithm. The ART clustering algorithm borrows the concept
used in the neural network approach and applies them to network anomaly detection.
This approach works by using the vigilance parameter to match an input to the best
existing cluster or create a new cluster if no match can be found. The concept of a
prototype is represented in the clustering algorithm by the center of each cluster. This
center shifts over time as new inputs are added to or removed from a cluster. The
movement and shifting of clusters is analogous to the changing classification patterns
and thus the clustering process must also be repeated until an equilibrium is reached.
Thus, the number of clusters is not fixed, but rather can change depending upon the
input dataset and the value of the clustering parameters.
The ART clustering approach starts with a set of all inputs, denoted by X. Each
input Xi is represented by a multi-dimensional vector that corresponds to the numer-
ical features that will be used for clustering.
X = (X1, X2, X3....Xn) (2.1)
Xi = (d1, d2, d3, ....dm) (2.2)
Where di corresponds to the numerical data along dimension i for the given input.
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The cluster prototype, which represents the center of a cluster is denoted by Pi for
the ith cluster. The cluster prototype is therefore represented by the same multi-
dimensional vector as the input Xi.
Pi = (d1, d2, d3, ....dm) (2.3)
Let Xi(dk) be the value of the ith element along dimension k and Pj(dk) be the
value of the jth cluster prototype along dimension k. The size and shape of the cluster
surrounding each prototype vector is based on the value of various input parameters
as shown in the following equation.
R =
m∑
j=1
(
Pj(dk)−Xi(dk)
Nk ∗ (1− vk)
)2
(2.4)
Where R is a user defined parameter known as the elliptical radius and Vk is
the vigilance parameter for dimension k. The original ART algorithm had a single
vigilance parameter that was used for all classification. The clustering algorithm
allows the vigilance parameter to be defined on a per - dimension basis. This is useful
for anomaly detection because it allows more weight to be given to certain dimension
as needed. Nk is the normalization constant for dimension k. Since the scale of the
numerical values can be different for each dimension, this constant is used to ensure
that the clustering results are not skewed due to numerical differences in the scale
of the dimensions. This constant is defined as the range of values spanned along the
dimension k as shown below.
Nk = max∀x∈X(Xk)−min∀x∈X(Xk) (2.5)
Equation 2.4 defines an ellipsoid in m-dimensional space. Due to the normalization
constant Nk, the vigilance parameter Vk effectively determines maximum value, as a
12
percentage of the totalrange of that value oon the given dimension, that a given input
can deviate from the cluster prototype. This is best illustrated in Figures 2-2 and 2-3.
These graphs show the relationship between the elliptical radius R and the vigilance
parameters Vi. Both graphs show two different ellipsoids. One of them is a circle and
the other is an oval stretched along the x-axis. The difference between the two figures
is the value of the elliptical radius. This demonstrates that the vigilance parameter
Vk effects the shape of the cluster, while the elliptical radius R effects its size.
Figure 2·2: Elliptical Ra-
dius of One
Figure 2·3: Elliptical Ra-
dius of Two
In order to determine the best match for a given datapoint, it is necessary to define
a distance function based on the ellipsoid of the cluster. Using the set of inputs X
and the cluster prototype vectors P clustering is done by calculating the following
distance function :
D(Cj, Xi) =
m∑
k=1
(
Pj(dk)−Xi(dk)
Nk ∗ (1− vk)
)2
(2.6)
This function determines the distance of the input Xi from the center of cluster
Cj, where Cj is represented by it’s prototype Pj. This distance is also dependent
on the on the vigilance parameters of each dimension. In order for an input to be
assigned to a cluster, this distance must fall within the maximum cluster size defined
by the elliptical radius R.
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D(Pj, Xi) ≤ R (2.7)
Point Xi is assigned to cluster Cj if the above equation holds true. If no such
cluster exists, then the input Xi forms a new cluster with itself as the prototype
vector. In the event that a single input can be assigned to more than one cluster, it
is assigned to the cluster with the smallest distance value. This corresponds to the
cluster with which the input is closest to the center as shown in equation 2.8.
Cj = min∀D(Pj ,Xi)≤RD(Pj, Xi) (2.8)
Once an input is assigned to a cluster, the reset function is called to update the
cluster prototype. The reset function must take into account the number of inputs
that were previously assigned to the chosen cluster so that the newly assigned point
does not have an unproportionally large influence on the prototype. Essentially this
makes the prototype vector a moving average of all points assigned to the given
cluster.
Pj(dk)
new = βP oldj (dk) + (1− β)Xi(dk) (2.9)
In the above equation, Xi is the point that was assigned to cluster J . This clusters
prototype Pj must be updated accordingly. The learning parameter β specifies the
degree to which the new datapoint Xi will shift the cluster prototype. This is done
along all dimensions of the cluster prototype. For the ART clustering algorithm, the
parameter β is equal to the size of the cluster. In this way, the cluster prototype Pj
becomes a moving average along all dimensions of the datapoints that are assigned
to cluster J .
14
βj = ||Cj|| (2.10)
The next group of figures show how the cluster prototype Pj shifts over time
as inputs are added to or removed from a given cluster. In Figure 2-4 the cluster
prototype is equal to the only datapoint assigned to the cluster. In Figure 2-5 a
second data point is added and so the prototype must move to represent two points.
Over time, more points are added to the cluster and the cluster prototype shifts, as
shown in Figure 2-6.
Figure 2·4: Cluster Proto-
type - One Point
Figure 2·5: Cluster Proto-
type - Two Points
Figure 2·6: Cluster Prototype - Multiple Points
This distance function must be calculated for every input in the set X on every
possible cluster Cj in the set of clusters C. Since the cluster prototypes and number
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of clusters themselves change over time, the algorithm must be repeated until an
equilibrium state is reached. For this reason the clustering algorithm is broken up
into two phases. In the first phase, each input in the set X is compared to all existing
clusters in C and the input is either assigned to an existing cluster, or a new cluster
is created. The first input X1 is assigned to cluster C1 by default. This phase exists
to give each input an initial cluster so that further analysis can be done.
Algorithm 1 ART Clustering Algorithm Phase One
Require: Input Data X = {x1, · · · , xn}
C1 = X1
Clast = C1
for i = 2→ n do
for j = 1→ last do
D = {Cj ∈ Cs.t.D(Pj, Xi) < r}
end for
if D = {} then
Clast+1 = Xi
else
Cmin = arg minCj∈C D(Pj, Xi)
Add Xi to Cmin
Recalculate cluster center of Cmin
end if
end for
In the first phase each input is assigned to the best existing cluster. However it is
important to recheck the assignment of each input to its cluster because it is possible
that a better match emerged as a result of the clustering process. The second phase
checks the cluster assignment for each input Xi to see if their exists a cluster Cj that
is a better match for the given input than its currently assigned cluster C ′. This
phase is repeated until an equilibrium state is reached.
The first phase is referred to as the initial input phase and the second phase is
the fluctuation phase. These two phases can be repeated as many times as needed
in order to cluster all data. This is especially useful in cases where the input data is
16
Algorithm 2 ART Clustering Algorithm Phase Two
Require: Input Data X = {x1, · · · , xn}, C = {c1, · · · , cj}
for i = 1→ n do
C ′ = Currently Assigned Cluster of Xi
for j = 1→ last do
Cmin = arg minCj∈C D(Pj, Xi)
end for
if Cmin = C
′ then
Do Nothing
else
Add Xi to Cmin
Remove Xi from C
′
Recalculate cluster center of Cmin and C
′
end if
end for
split up into multiple different data sets.
2.3 Anomaly Detection
Once all inputs are stable and the composition of the clusters does not change, the
anomaly detection process can begin. As a clustering algorithm, the ART method
must use some form of outlier detection in order to identify anomalies. This is com-
monly done with some type of distance or density metric over the clustered data.
Anomlies are then identified as the farthest or most sparsely populated data points.
However the notion of distance and density does not have any meaning when ap-
plied to network packets. IP addresses and ports do not have an inherent concept
of distance. As such, ART anomaly detection is done based on the assumption that
malicious network traffic (true anomalies) accounts for a small percentage of the to-
tal amount of observed network traffic. In this way anomalies are identified as the
smallest clusters in terms of total number of inputs assigned.
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IA(Ck) =

1, if |Ck| < |X||C| × τ
0, otherwise,
(2.11)
Equation 2.11 shows the anomaly detection process that occurs for each cluster.
|Ck| is the size of the kth cluster, |X| is the total number of datapoints in the input
set, and |C| is the total number of clusters created during the clustering process.
The anomaly detection function uses a threshold value τ that defines how small a
cluster must be and to be considered anomalous. This threshold value is based on
the assumption of a uniform distribution of input data points into cluster. Thus, the
indicator function takes on a value of 1 when the size each a given cluster |Ck| is
sufficiently small to be considered anomalous.
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Chapter 3
Network Simulation
3.1 Network Traffic Attributes
A network packet is characterized by several important features that distinguish it
in the stream of network traffic. The TCP-IP packet header has several fields that
can be useful for anomaly detection. The most notable of these are the source and
destination IP addresses, source and destination ports, the total size of the IP packet
and the protocol in use. In order to prevent the ”curse of dimensionality” it is
important to select the features that will have the greatest impact on the clustering
results.
The source and destination IP addresses are obvious choices to use, as it is im-
portant to understand different traffic patterns for different pairs of communicating
devices on the network. Similarly, the size (in bytes) of the packet is equally relevant.
The protocol and ports being used for communications are somewhat redundant in
terms of distinguishing network traffic. All common network protocols use well es-
tablished port numbers and must adhere to the established protocols in order for
communication to be successful. Thus knowing the IP address and relative size of
a packet is often enough to distinguish the unique traffic flow. For example, con-
sider a computer at IP address 10.1.1.1 communicating with its local DHCP server
at 10.200.40.1. The vast majority, if not all of the traffic between these two network
devices must adhere to the standards for the DHCP protocol defined in RFC 2131.
This standard specifies that UDP port 67 and 68 are used to communicate DHCP
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information between the client and server. Furthermore the standard specifies the
exact size, in bytes, of the various messages that are sent (approximately 300 to 500
bytes depending on the type of DHCP message). Thus when analyzing traffic be-
tween 10.1.1.1 and 10.200.40.1 it is enough to know that the DHCP server is located
at 10.200.40.1 and that the traffic is around 400 bytes on average. Recording the
specific protocol field (UDP) and ports numbers (67 and 68) does not provide any
additional information.
For our simulation it is important to extract the most useful information from
network packets. Let S = {s1, . . . , sp} be the set of all packets that traverse the
network, where each element Si is one packet. From each packet the source IP address,
destination IP address and byte size is extracted for analysis. Thus, Si = (IPs, IPd, b).
The goal of network anomaly detection is not so much to identify abnormal packets
as it is to identify abnormal network traffic. As such, it is important to think of the
individual packets as smaller pieces of a two-way communication between a pair of
nodes on the network. For this reason, packets can be grouped into network flows that
represent the two way communication process. Packets are grouped into a flow if they
have the same set of source and destination IP addresses and they are transmitted
consecutively within a small window of time. This window of time is set to 3.5 seconds
for all simulations.
Therefore, a flow is represented by F = (IPs, IPd, b, dt, t1) where dt is the duration
of the flow, or more specifically the time from the first to the last packet transmission,
and t1 is the transmission time of the first packet in the flow. Packets are agregated
into a single flow as long as the arrival time of the next packet does not exceed 3.5
seconds. A packet received after the 3.5 second window has ellapsed is considered the
first packet in a new flow.
As previously mentioned, IP addresses themselves have no inherent concept of
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distance as a number. Public IP addresses can be tracked to a geo spatial location,
however they are not distributed in any logical fashion. For example, the IP addresses
194.10.1.1, and 193.10.1.1 differ by just one number in the first octet, but this does
not imply that they are somehow close to each other in terms of physical distance.
They could be on the same street, or on opposite sides of the world.
However, when considering private IP address space, the octets themselves do give
a sense of the proximity of devices on a network. For example in an internal network,
devices might be assigned IP addresses such as 10.10.1.5 and 10.10.1.6. There is a
very good chance that these devices are physically connected to the same aggregation
device, such as a switch. Alternatively consider the IP address 10.10.1.187. It is likely
located on the same local area network as the other two devices in the sense that they
share a common gateway to the internet. However the large difference in the fourth
octet indicates that the physical ports they use are likely to be on different network
devices. This is not necessarily true for all network traffic, but the standard practice
is for network administrators to assign IP addresses in a logical fashion that usually
reflects the physical location of the devices.
For clustering purposes, it is necessary to quantize the IP addresses used by com-
municating devices into a real number. The concept of IP Distance, as described by
(Locke et al., 2003) will be used to accomplish this. For two IP addresses X and Y ,
the IP Distance between them is defined as follows.
d(X, Y ) = |X1 − Y1|2563 + |X2 − Y2|2562 + |X3 − Y3|256 + |X4 − Y4|. (3.1)
Where X1 represents the first octet of IP address X, X2 represents the second
octet, and so on. We use this distance as a numerical representation of the com-
munication between two nodes on the network. While the actual notion of the IP
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Distance may seem arbitrary, the important thing to note is that for a given source
and destination pair, the IP distance will be the same for all flows between the two
communicating nodes. There is a small probability of overlap in which the same IP
distance can represent multiple source and destination pairs, but in practice this is
unlikely to occur. Even if ithis did occur, it is likely that the traffic would be distin-
guishable in some other way. Using the IP distance metric, we get a representation
for a traffic flow as F = (D(s, d), b, dt, t1) where D(s, d) is the IP distance metric
between the source and destination.
To this point all of the features extracted from network traffic have been unique to
the individual packets themselves. However, the ART algorithm also needs a method
to distinguish anomalies that arise from changes in the number of packets transmitted
over time. These anomalies will be referred to as temporal anomalies in that they
correspond to the number of flows being transmitted and not the actual content of
the flows themselves. To capture this for clustering purposes, the ART algorithm
adds a frequency dimension that counts the number of flows for each unique source
and destination pair. For this purpose a flow transmitted from A to B is considered
the same as one transmitted from B to A since the communication is between the
same two nodes. This frequency count, represented by f is the final feature added to
the flow representation, as shown in Equation 3.2.
Fi = (D(s, d), b, dt, t1, f) (3.2)
A single flow Fi is a single data point that is used as an input to the anomaly
detection algorithm. The total number of inputs is denoted by n. The start time of the
flow t1 is not used for clustering purposes, but is included to show the network traffic
over time. This leaves four dimensions that can be used for clustering. These four
dimensions are the IP Distance D(s, d), the flow size (in bytes) b, the flow duration
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Figure 3·1: Simulation Network One
(in seconds) dt and the frequency of flows f . Note that the frequency value f is not
strictly a property of the flow itself but rather a property of all flows having the same
source and destination IP addresses.
3.2 Network Models
To demonstrate the performance of the ART clustering algorithm, two different sim-
ulations are used. The first simulation uses a simple client - server network model
with two subnets in order to mimic hosts trying to access data from a central server.
The goal of this simulation is to demonstrate the basic capabilities of the ART clus-
tering algorithm and to test the effect that changing the simulation parameters has
on the final clustering results. The network topology for this simulation can be seen
in Figure 3-1
The network flow generation tool FS (Sommers et al., 2011) was used to generate
the network flow data between the clients and the server. The settings given to FS to
generate the network flows are shown in Figure 3-2. For each subnet in the network
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Parameter Value
Source IP Random from the given subnet
Destination IP 165.14.130.9
Bytes Gaussian (Mean = 30,000,000 Deviation = 3,000,000)
Interval between flows Gaussian Distribution (Mean = 240, Deviation = 60)
Figure 3·2: Learning Network Nominal Traffic
Anomaly Type Detection Difficulty
Atypical User High
Atypical User Medium
Atypical User Low
Atypical Flow Duration High
Atypical Flow Duration Medium
Atypical Flow Duration Low
Atypical Flow Rate High
Atypical Flow Rate Medium
Atypical Flow Rate Low
Atypical Duration and Rate High
Atypical Duration and Rate Medium
Atypical Duration and Rate Low
Atypical User and Rate High
Atypical User and Rate Medium
Atypical User and Rate Low
Figure 3·3: Learning Network Abnormal Traffic
FS generates one flow on an average of 4 minutes. This flow is on average 30Mb and
is meant to represent a download of data from the server. This nominal data set has
3572 sample data points.
In addition to the nominal sample data, a second data set was used that included
a mix of additional nominal flows along with a group of anomalous flows of varying
types and sizes. The second data set contains 1676 flows of which 48 are considered
anomalies. The dataset contains two of each type of the anomalous flows shown in
Figure 3-3. Each anomaly type was assigned a detection difficulty (low, medium,
high) to attempt to determine the appropriate vigilance parameter needed to identify
them. Anomalies with a higher detection difficulty lie very close to clusters of nominal
network traffic and therefore should be harder to detect.
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Figure 3·4: Realistic Simulation Network
The second network simulation is a more realistic and is intended to demonstrate
the performance of the ART clustering algorithm in a real world scenario. The net-
work for this simulation is based on an organizations internal network with several
connections to the internet as shown in Figure 3-4.
The flow samples for this network simulation were creating using the tool SADIT
(Wang, 2013). This tool is an extension of the FS tool that includes additional func-
tionality for generating realistic network anomalies. The nominal traffic parameters
were set differently for each node in the network in order to create a more realistic
simulation. As a general rule the network follows the model that 80% of all network
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Parameter Value
Source IP Random
Destination IP Random
Bytes Gaussian (Mean = 4,000 Deviation = 500)
Flow Inter-Arrival Time Gaussian (Mean = 0.025, Deviation = 0.005)
Figure 3·5: Simulation Network Nominal Traffic
Input Dataset Total Datapoints Number of Anomalies Type of Anomalies
One 327231 162 Unknown User
Two 3 1000 Large Access Rate
Three 376896 1803 Large Download Size
Figure 3·6: Simulation Network Abnormal Traffic
traffic is internal with 20% of the traffic being external to the internet. All traffic
to and from the internet must pass through the gateway router (10.1.1.1) and hub
router (10.200.30.9). Additionally all internal network traffic must pass through the
hub router in order to traverse the network from one workstation to another. The
nominal network traffic in this simulation has the characteristics shown in Figure 3-5.
In addition to the nominal network traffic, three types of anomalous flows were
created. The first was an Unknown User anomaly in which traffic originates from an
otherwise unknown IP Address that resides outside of the LAN. The machine 5.6.8.9
was used for this purpose. The second was a Large Download Size anomaly in which
the size of a network flow was increased to twice the normal size (from 4,000 bytes
to 8,000 bytes). The third was a Large Access Rate anomaly where the frequency
of flows between a given source and destination pair was increased to six times the
normal. This could also be though of as decreasing the interval between flows to
one sixth of the original size. A simulation was ran separately for each of the three
anomalies and the anomalous flows were randomly inserted into the network traffic
stream. The total number of nominal and anomalous flows for each simulation is
outlined in Figure 3-6.
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The ART network clustering simulation was implemented in C++. The simu-
lation takes a flow of network flow samples as input, clusters them using the ART
clustering algorithm and outputs the results. The output can be in a variety of for-
mats include text files and graph data that can be used with GNU Plot (GNUPlot,
2013). Additionally a Windows form program was developed to provide a user in-
terface to more easily modify simulation parameters, run clustering simulations and
graph the results. The details of the software can be found at the authors website at
(Rossell, 2013).
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Chapter 4
Results
4.1 Learning Network
The ART algorithm results for the learning network are intended to show how chang-
ing the various parameters of the simulation effects the clustering results and the
anomaly detection results. Additionally, it is a good tool to demonstrate how the
clustering algorithm works in general. The learning network simulation used the fol-
lowing three dimensions : the IP distance D(s, d),the bytes size b, and the duration
dt of the flow.
First, it is important to get an understanding of the clusters growth over the differ-
ent phases of the clustering process. The following figures show the entire clustering
process over all three phases for a vigilance parameter of 0.75 along all dimensions,
with an elliptical radius of 1 and a detection threshold of 0.1.
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Figure 4·1: Entire Clustering Process
The Y axis shows the number of samples assigned to each cluster. The X axis
shows the growth of the clusters over time. An iteration is defined as the processing
of a single datapoint and assigning it to a cluster. Thus the total number of iterations
needed is a function of the size of the input dataset and the number of times each
datapoint must be checked until an equilibrium state is reached. For this simulation,
each datapoint in the initial set was analyzed once during phase one, and twice during
phase two. Then a second second set of input data was added to the simulation and
each datapoint in this second set was analyzed and clustered in phase three.
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Figure 4·2: Phase One Clustering
Figure 4-1 shows the entire three phase process from start to finish. Figure 4-2
shows the initial cluster assignment of the 3572 samples during phase one. Clusters
are not moved around until the second phase so the clusters sizes will not decrease
during phase one.
Figure 4·3: Phase Two Clustering
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Figure 4-3 shows the fluctuation phase of the 3572 samples. One cluster tends
to dominate as samples from other clusters are moved into the large cluster with
approximately 1500 samples. This cluster did not exist until part way through phase
one so the algorithm could not identify this cluster as the best match for the majority
of the samples until the second phase. The second phase continues until no clusters
are moved for an entire cycle (each cluster is checked once) so the number of samples in
each cluster stays constant for an entire set of iterations. At this point the simulation
can be completed and anomaly detection can begin, or a second input dataset can be
added to the simulation and phase three clustering will begin. While this example
shows two fluctuation cycles, there can be more depending on the characteristics of
the input data. The fluctuation process must continue until no data points are moved
between clusters.
Figure 4·4: Phase 3 Process
The last phase, shown in Figure 4-4 contains a second input file which contains a
mix of nominal and anomalous flows. The nominal flows where added to the existing
clusters, but no match could be made for the anomalous flows so a large number
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of new clusters with very few data points were created. These can be seen at the
crowded area towards the bottom of the graph where the lines overlap.
The initial simulations were done with a constant vigilance parameter along all
dimensions and were intended to show the results of the initial clustering process
without any anomalous data.
Figure 4·5: Initial Clustering Results (vigilance = 0.95)
Figure 4-5 shows the clustering results for a high vigilance parameter. A large
number of clusters was created due to the high value of the vigilance parameter.
Conversely, the number of total clusters decreases as the vigilance parameter is low-
ered. A lower vigilance parameter defines a larger ellipsoid in the geometric plane
and thus more data points are able to fit within the defined cluster space. Figure
4-6 shows that a smaller number of clusters was created with a vigilance parameter
of 0.5 as compared to 0.95 in Figure 4.5. Complete results showing the number of
clusters created and number of falsely flagged anomalous clusters (flase positives) are
shown in Figure 4-7 for the case where the vigilance parameter is the same along all
dimensions.
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Figure 4·6: Initial Clustering Results (vigilance = 0.5)
Vi Clusters False Positives
0.95 57 15
0.9 29 8
0.85 24 6
0.8 20 3
0.75 16 4
0.50 9 3
0.25 4 1
0.1 4 1
Figure 4·7: Effect of Vigilance Parameter on Clustering
Due to the dynamic nature of the clustering process and the machine learning
aspect of the algorithm, the order of the input data can have an effect on the final
clustering results. To determine the effect that randomized input order has on the
clustering process a series of simulations was performed with a vigilance parameter of
0.9 and with the order of the input data set completely randomized. Specifically, the
position of each Xi in the input data set X was chosen uniformly at random. The
results of these simulations are shown in Figure 4-8. The number of total clusters
varied between 27 and 31 and the number of false positive clusters varied between
7 and 9. Note that these types of variations are more likely to be seen at higher
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vigilance parameters because more clusters are created and thus slight variations in
the order of the input are more likely to affect the cluster distribution.
Simulation Run Clusters False Positives
Non Random 29 8
1 31 8
2 30 9
3 27 7
4 31 7
5 31 7
Figure 4·8: Results of Random Input Order
Figures 4-9 and 4-10 show the results of two different simulation runs with exactly
the same parameters, but with a different randomized ordering of the input data set.
Note the shifts in the prototype vectors for some of the clusters.
Figure 4·9: Random Simulation 1 (vigilance = 0.9)
Next a series of simulations was conducted to show how changing the vigilance
parameter along a single dimension affects the clsutering results. Figure 4-11 shows
the clustering and anomaly identification process for the case when the vigilance
parameter is the same along all dimensions. It shows the total number of clusters
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Figure 4·10: Random Simulation 2 (vigilance = 0.9)
created, the number of anomalous clusters created and the false positive rate. The
false positive rate is the percentage of non anomalous data points that are assigned
to clusters which were flagged as anamolous.
V1 V2 V3 Total
Clus-
ters
False
Posi-
tiveR-
ate
0.95 0.95 0.95 150 0.8%
0.9 0.9 0.9 94 1.3%
0.85 0.85 0.85 79 0.7%
0.8 0.8 0.8 74 1.7%
0.75 0.75 0.75 82 2.6%
0.50 0.50 0.50 88 3.0%
0.25 0.25 0.25 33 0.9%
0.1 0.1 0.1 16 2.3%
Figure 4·11: Variation of Vigilance Parameters
Note that while the false positive rate varied with the vigilance parameter, the
anomaly identification rate stayed constant at 100%. All of the anomalous flows
and their associated data points where correctly identified and clustered. At higher
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vigilance values, the anomalous flows are distributed amongst 15 clusters. However, as
the vigilance parameter decreased, the total number of anomalous clusters decreased
because the anomalous flows began to get assigned to the same cluster. In other
words, the lower vigilance value allowed some of the anomalous clusters to merge.
The results of the clustering process show that the best false positive rates for
ideal anomaly identification occur when the vigilance parameter is the range of 0.8 to
0.9 along all dimensions. However a more optimal rate may be obtained by varying
the value of the vigilance parameter for each dimension individually.
The next series of simulations demonstrate what happens when two of the dimen-
sions were set at a constant rate of 0.85 and the third dimension was allowed to vary
freely. This was done for all three dimensions by allowing one to vary at a time. In
this way it may be possible to extrapolate the optimal vigilance parameter settings
that have a minimum false positive rate, but are still able to identify all anomalous
inputs. Figures 4-12 through 4-14 show the results of these simulations.
V1 V2 V3 Total
Clus-
ters
False
Pos-
itive
Rate
Anomaly
ID
Rate
0.9 0.85 0.85 83 1.6% 100%
0.8 0.85 0.85 81 1.2% 100%
0.75 0.85 0.85 82 1.3% 100%
0.7 0.85 0.85 90 2.4% 100%
0.6 0.85 0.85 62 0.9% 100%
0.5 0.85 0.85 60 0.7% 100%
0.25 0.85 0.85 61 0.6% 100%
Figure 4·12: Variation of IP Distance Vigilance Parameter
One important observation is that the variation of the vigilance parameter along
a single dimension did not improve the false positive rate over the case where all three
dimensions had a vigilance parameter of 0.85 and a false positive rate of 0.7%. How-
ever two important patterns emerge from the above simulations. First, the number
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V1 V2 V3 Total
Clus-
ters
False
Pos-
itive
Rate
Anomaly
ID
Rate
0.85 0.9 0.85 91 1.3% 100%
0.85 0.8 0.85 79 0.9% 100%
0.85 0.75 0.85 76 1.6% 100%
0.85 0.7 0.85 73 1.1% 100%
0.85 0.6 0.85 69 1.3% 100%
0.85 0.5 0.85 71 1.5% 100%
0.85 0.25 0.85 62 2.0% 100%
Figure 4·13: Variation of Flow Size Vigilance Parameter
V1 V2 V3 Total
Clus-
ters
False
Pos-
itive
Rate
Anomaly
ID
Rate
0.85 0.85 0.9 87 1.5% 100%
0.85 0.85 0.8 81 1.3% 100%
0.85 0.85 0.75 78 1.6% 100%
0.85 0.85 0.7 77 2.4% 100%
0.85 0.85 0.6 73 1.6% 100%
0.85 0.85 0.5 72 1.1% 100%
0.85 0.85 0.25 76 1.0% 100%
Figure 4·14: Variation of Flow Duration Vigilance Parameter
of total clusters and false positive rate tends to hit a maximum value in the range of
0.6 to 0.8 vigilance for each dimension. Thus, it may be optimal to stay out of this
range in order to minimize false positives. Second, the anomaly identification rate
was constant at 100% for all dimensions. Although the anomalies in this simulation
were rather simplistic and designed to be easy to detect, this is a good indication of
the overall accuracy of the algorithm. This is most likely due to the fact that the
cluster size is set to a radius of one. Increasing the size of the ellipsoid would allow
for more samples to fit inside a give cluster. With a lower elliptical radius value, a
dimension with a higher vigilance parameter will tend to dominate the elliptical area
so that a sample with only a slight deviation on another dimension may force the
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datapoint out of the cluster.
The next set of simulations increases the elliptical radius parameter in order to
determine the effect on the false positive and anomaly identification rates. A set
of simulations was ran with an elliptical radius of two and then a similar set of
simulations was done with an elliptical radius of five. The following graphs in figures
4-15 through 4-17 show the false positive rate of the simulation with different elliptical
radii as the vigilance parmeter is varied along a single dimension. The vigilance
parameter on the other two dimensions is kept constant at 0.85
Figure 4·15: False Posi-
tive Rates vs Vigilance Pa-
rameter (R = 1)
Figure 4·16: False Posi-
tive Rates vs Vigilance Pa-
rameter (R = 2)
Figure 4·17: False Positive Rates vs Vigilance Parameter (R = 5)
These graphs show that there is no clear pattern that emerges as to the optimal
conditions for the vigilance paremeter so as to minimize the false positive rate. How-
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ever, even in the worst case, the false positive rate is below 4%. For most simulations
their appears to be a optimal zone between a vigilance of 0.6 to 0.8 in which the false
positive rate is less than 2%. This may not be the absolute minimum for that given
dimension, but this is probably good enough for most purposes.
Up to this point all input data has been from a single input file. A second data
set was added to the simulation network in order to demonstrate phase three of the
clustering process. When two input data sets exists, the ART clustering algorithm
will cluster the first dataset until it reaches an equilibrium and then start to analyze
points from the second data set. This is very useful when there exists a data set of
known good traffic. The nominal traffic can be included in the first data set. This
makes anomaly detection easier in the second data set as the creation of any new
cluster is likely an indication of an anomaly. However, it is also possible that a new
cluster is the emergence of a previously unseen traffic pattern.
Figure 4-18 shows a zoomed in view of the nominal range of data. In addition to
the anomalies previously described, the second input set contained additional clusters
of nominal data that can be seen below the original input set. This is the emergenc
of a new traffic pattern from the second subnet of the network. This second set
also contained a large number of anomalies that were explained in Figure 3-3. The
anomalies that were identified by the detection algorithm can be seen in red. Figure
4-19 shows the final clustering results for the entire simulation in three dimensions.
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Figure 4·18: Second Input Phase - 2D
Figure 4·19: Second Input Phase - 3D
4.2 Realistic Network
The realistic network simulation is intended to show how the ART clustering algo-
rithm would perform in a real world environment. For this simulation all four of the
input dimensions are used. The network flow data was split into three files. Each
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file contained a large number of nominal flows along with one of the three types of
anomalies identified in Figure 3-6.
Figure 4·20: Realistic Simulation - Input 1
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Figure 4·21: Realistic Simulation - Input 1
Figure 4-20 shows the clustering results for the first input file utilizing a different
color for each cluster. One distinct region of flows with an IP distance of 1x108
can easily be seen. This regions represents the anomalies in this input file, which
correspond to the Unknown User Case. Due to the large size of the input data set, it
is often difficult to distinguish the flows that were classified as anomalies. To make
this process easier, the algorithm can graph all nominal datapoints as green and all
datapoints it thinks are anomalies as red. This is seen in Figure 4-21.
Figure 4-22 shows the results of the second input file. The graph in this figure
graph gives a different perspective on how anomalies can be detected. The X-axis
shows the frequency of flows transmitted between a given source and destination IP
pair. This allows the algorithm to detect anomalies in terms of the amount of traffic
generated.
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Figure 4·22: Realistic Simulation - Input 2
In this simulation there are 14 nodes in the network. This corresponds to 91
unique source and destination pairs. Most nodes in the network had either 1000 or
2000 total flows between them. However a smaller number of node pairs had around
2700 or 2800 total flows. These node pairs only accounted for around 11 of the 91
total pairs. However these 11 node pairs comprised approximately 20% of the total
number of network flows due to the fact that packets were transmitted between these
11 nodes with much higher frequency than the average.
This simulation also demonstrates one potential flaw with the anomaly detection
algorithm. The underlying assumption that network anomalies comprise a small
percentage of network traffic means that it will be difficult to detect bursts in network
traffic that might be suspicious.
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Figure 4·23: Realistic Simulation - Input 3
Figure 4·24: Realistic Simulation - Input 3
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The clustering results of the third input dataset show two distinct regions. The
first region corresponds to datapoints with a flow size of around 4,000 to 4,500 bytes.
The second region shows datapoint with a larger flow size of around 8,000 to 8,500.
This second region corresponds to Large Download Rate anomalies. Visually it is
often difficult to determine the anomalies because the size of the datasets is large and
the points overlap when plotted. In fact the region on the right contains less than
1% of the number of datapoints on the left.
This case provides a good way to demonstrate the effect of the anomaly detection
threshold parameter on a realistic data set. The following figures show the clustering
results for the third input file as the threshold value is increased from 0.005 to 0.2.
Anomalies are identified in red.
Figure 4·25: Detection
Threshold = 0.005
Figure 4·26: Detection
Threshold = 0.01
It is clear that as the threshold value increases, the number of clusters that are
considered anomalous, and therefore the number of red datapoints, increases as well.
Most of the anomalies are identified at a threshold value of 0.025. However 100%
detection of anomalies does not occur until a threshold value of 0.1 At this point
many clusters in the nominal region start to become flagged as anomalies as well. So
while 100% detection is often achievable, it comes at the price of having a higher false
positive rate.
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Figure 4·27: Detection
Threshold = 0.025
Figure 4·28: Detection
Threshold = 0.05
Figure 4·29: Detection
Threshold = 0.1
Figure 4·30: Detection
Threshold = 0.2
In anomaly detection one of the most useful tools for characterizing the perfor-
mance of a detection algorithm is the Receiver Operating Characteristic, or ROC
curve. This curve graphs the true positive versus false positive rate for a given
anomaly detection algorithm as the corresponding detection parameter is changed.
The ROC curve for the three input data sets in the realistic network scenario are
shown in figure 4-32.
The effectiveness of a detection algorithm is often explained in terms of the area
under the curve or AUC of the algorithm’s ROC graph. The AUC can vary from
0 to 1, with a value of 1 representing a perfect classification algorithm. A perfect
algorithm would have a 100% true positive rate and a 0% false positive rate. For the
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anomalous traffic presented in this simulation, the ART clustering algorithm had an
AUC of 0.99 for the Large Download Size and Abnormal User case and an AUC of
around 0.9 for the Large Access Rate Case.
Figure 4·31: ART Clustering ROC Curve
4.3 Comparison to Other Methods
Several other anomaliy detection methods were also used to identify anomalies on the
realistic network simulation. This was done in order to compare the results of the
ART method to other well establish anomaly detection algorithms. These include two
statistical methods based on Large Deviations Theory (LDT) (Dembo and Zeitouni,
2009) and two types of Support Vector Machines (SVM) (Hastie et al., 2009). The
implementation details of these simulations can be found in (Wang et al., 2013).
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In order to see the flows in the simulation that are identified as anomalies, it is
necessary to create a common frame of reference so that the results of the various
methods can be comapred. The ART and SVM based methods are able to identify
the specific flows that they believe to be anomalous. These anomalous flows are
graphed on a timeline to show the time in the simulation at which they occur. The
statistical methods cannot identify specific flows that are anomalous but rather track
the entropy value of the simulation in order to identify windows of time that are
anomalous. These windows of time are shown on a graph of the simulation time. The
combined results for the three anomaly types are shown in the figures below.
Figure 4·32: Abnormal
User Anomaly Combined
Results
Figure 4·33: Large Acces
Rate Anomaly Combined
Results
The combined results are promising as they shows that the anomalies identified by
the ART method line up very closely with those identified by the other approaches.
The ART method shows some false positives for the Abnormal User and Large Access
Rate anomalies but for the most part the anomalous flows identified by the ART
method fall within the anomalous window of time identified by the statistical methods.
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Figure 4·34: Large Download Size Anomaly Combined Results
The ART anomaly detection algorithm also generally outperforms the SVM methods
in terms of detection and false positive rates.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
The ART Clustering algorithm provides a unique perspective to the problem of net-
work anomaly detection. This thesis has shown that the algorithm can achieve very
good anomaly detection results utilizing only a few key features of network traffic
data. The AUC characteristics of the ROC curve show that the ART clustering algo-
rithm is very efficient at detecting anomalous traffic when the amount of anomalous
traffic is small in proportion to the amount of nominal or normal traffic. For an
unsupervised learning algorithm with no prior knowledge of nominal network traffic,
these results are very promising.
It should also be pointed out that the ART clustering algorithm can act as a
supervised learning algorithm. Given a set of clusters that are known to be good
traffic, the ART algorithm simply becomes a classification scheme in which it attempts
to assign unkown data points to the known good clusters. Any data point which
cannot fit inside a good cluster based on the given vigilance parameters is labeled as
an anomaly.
When the amount of anomalous network traffic grows in proportion to the total
amount of traffic, the algorithm tends to perform poorly. This was scene in the
case of the Large Access Rate anomaly. The amount of anomalous traffic grew to
approximately 15% of the total network traffic and the AUC value for the detection
results dropped to 0.9 from 0.99. This makes the ART algorithm a poor choice for
detecting large scale network anomalies such as denial of service attacks. However,
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these types of attacks tend to be easily identified by other means.
The fact that the ART algorithm is able to achieve good detection rates while
using a small number of dimensions as input data make this algorithm very practical
for use in real world networks. The runtime of the algorithm is dependent on both
the input parameters and the number of times the algorithm must repeat phase two
in order to find the best match. However, results have shown that the algorithm can
process data at speeds aproaching 10 Gbps, which makes it useful in a live network
environment.
The major drawback of the ART clustering algorithm is the inability to algorith-
mically determine the optimal custering parameters for a given type of anomaly. Up
to this point, the ideal parameters have only been determined after a trial and error
process requiring human intervention. Since the type of anomalies were known be-
forehand, it is easy to tune the detection parameters to be overly sensitive to a small
deviation along a certain dimension. For example increasing the vigilance parameter
for a given dimension to 0.99 means that the algorithm will isolate data points that
deviate from the majority by even a small amount. In a live network environment,
the choice of a given set of paremeters may provide good detection rates for a certain
type of anomaly but it could limit the algorithms ability to identify another type
of anomaly. This may require running the detection algorithm multiple types with
differents sets of input parameters in order to detect different types of anomalies.
Future work will focus on optimization algorithms that can mathematically deter-
mine the optimal set of clustering parameters to produce the best clustering results.
This may involve comparing clustering results over a range of vigilance parameter and
elliptical radius values and combining the results in some way to identify anomalies.
More efficient detection of temporal anomalies is another area for further research.
The current model tracks the frequency of flows between specific pairs of communicat-
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ing nodes. This type of algorithm should be expanded to compare clustering results
over different windows of time and to track the growth of clusters over time. This will
allow for better detection of anomalies that result from deviations in traffic patterns
over time.
The ART algorithm can also be extended to cluster any type of data. The datasets
used in these simulations consisted entirely of network traffic data. However, a more
generalized version of the ART clustering software can take any type of numerical
data as input and generate clustering results using the ART clustering algorithm.
The software for the general anaomlay detection algorithm can also be found at the
author’s website (Rossell, 2013).
The use of Adaptive Resonance Theory as a clustering algorithm has proved to be
an excellent tool for the detection of anomolous network traffic. The need to provide
security against previously unseen attacks or zero day exploits will always be present
in computer networks. The problem of identifying an abnormality exists in all fields
of study. This thesis has shown that the use of theoretical concepts from areas outside
of computer security, in this case biology, can provide very promising results.
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